

THE PATH TO REFORMS AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS CONFRONTS TODAY'S CHINA

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Introduction: Thirty years after Deng Xiaoping's "Southern Tour," China faces a new set of challenges

Thirty years ago this month, from January 18th to February 21st, 1992, Deng Xiaoping, the paramount but nominally retired leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC), undertook his "Southern Tour" of Chinese market-oriented cities including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai. This was not a routine visit. Deng used his travels to tip the balance in an internal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) struggle over economic policy in favor of pro-capitalist reforms.

The historical context of Deng's tour is crucial. The inner party struggle over economic policy emerged immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and three years after the mass protest movement and crackdown at Tiananmen Square. The Chinese government confronted a major, even existential, crisis, leading the CCP to a crossroad. Would it essentially dissolve itself, as its counterpart in Moscow had done, and move toward a rapid and wholesale sell-off of state industry? Would it attempt to retreat to national autarky, as in the days of Mao Zedong? Or would its response perhaps fall somewhere between these two poles?

Deng's Southern Tour delivered the answer. In China, the CCP would maintain its single-party dictatorship—but over an increasingly capitalist China that would embrace the foreign exploitation of its massive, and cheap, labor force. Unlike its Soviet counterpart, which disbanded in 1991, the CCP itself would control and steer capitalist development.

The trajectory initiated in 1992 drew the arc of China's subsequent development, up until the present, which makes the Southern Tour a major historical event. As we noted in our CIO Perspective, "A Shifting World Order: China's Faustian Bargain" published in May 2021:

"The brutal crackdown at Tiananmen Square and throughout the country announced the CCP's intention to continue to suppress both democratic rights and social protests such as labor strikes. Under these conditions, a faction of the bureaucracy that favored a slower pace of economic reform took the upper hand against Deng for a brief period. The collapse of the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, however, clearly demonstrated that the political survival of the CCP bureaucracy was at stake, leading it to re-double its efforts to embrace market reforms, as symbolized by Deng's 1992 "Southern Tour" of the Chinese cities that had gone farthest in promoting

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capitalism. Human rights organizations sharply criticized the regime's brutality at Tiananmen. However, following Deng's Southern Tour, western capital continued to flow in, comforted by the CCP's message: worker militancy shall be crushed, order will prevail, and China remains open for business. Between 1992 and 2010, the Chinese economy grew eleven-fold."

Three decades of capitalist growth have transformed China in fundamental ways. It has gone from being a massive and underdeveloped "Third World" country to the world's second-largest economy, and a leader in certain high-tech industries. It has been transformed from the planet's largest concentration of poverty to what the World Bank defines as an "upper-middle-income country," headed up by the world's second-largest detachment of dollar billionaires, after the United States. It has gone from being Washington's junior partner in a tacit anti-Soviet alliance to being a "peer competitor" and strategic rival of the United States.

But in one key respect, China has not changed since the Southern Tour. It remains politically dominated by the CCP. The tensions and contradictions that have built up in Chinese society—including the fact that it is under immense pressure from the United States and American allies—are mediated almost entirely within the centralized party leadership. In fact, Deng's inheritor as paramount leader, Xi Jinping, has monopolized the levers of political power to a far greater degree than was imaginable three decades ago.

The CCP under Xi now grapples with a similar set of questions thirty years after the Southern Tour. How far will Beijing go in its embrace of global capitalism? Will it seek to shield itself from the destabilizing effects of global finance? Though the lessons of Deng's intervention will be on Xi's mind, the answer may not be the same. The world, not just China, is much changed since 1992.

Yet a common thread links Deng's moves in 1989 to Xi's planning in 2022. That thread is the survival of the CCP bureaucracy. The economic and political measures it is compelled to take emerge out of the dynamic interaction between domestic and international concerns, just as they did three decades ago.

The instability brought on by the capitalist opening in the 1980s, together with a foreign environment that witnessed relatively similar regimes, such as the Soviet Union, disappear overnight, prompted bureaucratic infighting as to whether the opening had gone too far and whether it was time to reverse course. Deng's Southern Tour was meant to overcome the infighting by dramatizing a way forward for the bureaucracy. The CCP would build popular legitimacy by delivering growth—and therefore continue on the road of capitalist opening—while clamping down on political freedoms and liberalization.

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Thirty years of capitalist growth have produced new, but no less challenging, contradictions. The rise of formidable new power centers built on the intersection of finance and the internet has created a magnet for financial flows and human capital. These pressures have emerged in an increasingly hostile foreign environment. In response, Beijing is intent on rationalizing the economy to withstand pressure, largely organized by the United States, across several fronts. First, it seeks to develop high-end technologies such as semiconductors to overcome export bans, which have proved crippling in the cases of ZTE and Huawei. Second, it looks to decrease financial vulnerability by reducing leverage and cleaning up persistent debt issues, particularly in the real estate sector. Finally, it aims to divert capital away from what it views to be wasteful economic sectors, such as for-profit online tutoring, gaming, and social media apps, while imposing tough regulatory controls on online platforms. Only within this framework is it possible to understand Xi's economic maneuvers of the past year—as well as the resolute measures Beijing has taken to contain the COVID pandemic.

In this report, we will consider the history leading up to Deng's Southern Tour—the Tiananmen Square crackdown and the military response to the "June 4th Movement" and the dissolution of the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We will then review the Southern Tour itself, as well as its outcome, before concluding with consideration of China's present position.

I. Tiananmen

From April to June 1989, a protest movement gathered steam in Chinese cities. Though the demonstrations became national in scope, the center was Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

The commonly accepted narrative around Tiananmen as a pro-democracy student movement brutally crushed by the CCP regime is true but incomplete, as it overlooks three key aspects. First, the protests took root within a fissure that ran through the CCP leadership itself over key areas of policy, especially economic and democratic reform. Second, this dispute played out within a global context that had just witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe. Third, there were concerns within the CCP about social anger in the population stemming from mounting inequality, corruption, and inflation after 15 years of pro-market reform that had seen the dismantling of China's social safety net, the so-called "Iron Rice Bowl" policies of lifetime employment, childcare, housing, health care, and pensions. As we wrote in our CIO Perspective, "China's Faustian Bargain":

"The events surrounding the Tiananmen Square protests of May and June 1989

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demonstrated the dangers of the regime's embrace of capitalism. While the western media focused on the students and middle-class elements in the demonstrations, Tiananmen Square was in reality just the focal point of a nationwide protest movement that involved millions of workers, who had begun to raise social, and more explosively, political demands."

Social and political resentments intertwined. The Chinese economy had grown rapidly since Deng launched the country on the path of market reform. But the gains were uneven. CCP leaders and their families used influence to corner commodities purchased at fixed state prices, only to resell them for profit at the free markets created in the Special Enterprise Zones that had been set up by Deng's reforms. This resulted in hoarding, speculation, and inflation. In the late 1980s, the CCP responded with austerity and a reassertion of state regulations, which slowed GDP growth to 4% in 1989.

This was the national context in which the Tiananmen Square protest movement, also called the June 4th Movement, appeared in the Spring of 1989. As had been the case with previous demonstrations in the history of the PRC, protesters seized on the public funeral of a reputed party reformer as a means of airing grievances. In this case, the deceased was former CCP general secretary Hu Yaobang. Hu had been associated with the promotion of democratic reforms, but had been forced from power in 1987 when these reforms were blamed for a student protest movement that year. To the CCP's surprise, Hu's funeral drew tens of thousands of attendees, and a protest movement followed, with Tiananmen Square providing the central drama. The protests snowballed—with crowds in Tiananmen estimated at 1 million at their height—and spread to scores of cities, perhaps 400 in all, eventually drawing in industrial workers who had seen inflation gobble up the purchasing power of their earnings.

The protesters, having used the death of a reformer as an opening, again benefitted from the divisions within the CCP—for a short time, at least. One party faction supported a peaceful resolution, and another, "hardline" grouping, demanded a crackdown. It was precisely these divisions that allowed the protests to drag on for two months. But when the protests spread to provincial cities, intersecting with social grievances, and when industrial workers began to join the movement with strike action, Deng and the regime moved decisively. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) crushed the Tiananmen demonstration on June 4th, with considerable bloodshed. Estimates of the death toll range from several hundred to several thousand. The crackdown scuttled the idea that China would gradually embark on a process of democratic political reform. In the wake of the protests, the repressive apparatus of the state was strengthened and has never relented since.

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II. The Dissolution of Stalinism

These were specifically Chinese events. Yet, a full understanding of the CCP's reaction to Tiananmen, culminating in Deng's Southern Tour, would require us to place those developments within their global context. On June 4th, the same day as the Tiananmen massacre, Poland held open elections—a concession to the Solidarity Movement—that delivered a shattering blow to the ruling Communist Party. One month earlier, with the Tiananmen protests already underway, Hungary had demilitarized its border with Austria. In the following months, thousands of citizens of East Germany crossed through Hungary for West Germany, initiating a chain of events that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989, and the reintegration of the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany. By the end of 1989, Stalinist regimes had collapsed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Only the last instance produced significant violence, culminating on December 25th, 1989, in the execution by military tribunal of the longtime dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, who had maintained close relations with China since the 1970s. The restoration of capitalism continued in 1990 in Albania, and, by the summer of 1992, Yugoslavia was breaking up with the Western-backed secession of its wealthier northern regions of Slovenia and Croatia, portending a vicious ethno-communal civil war in the Balkans.

In previous moments of social opposition in Eastern Europe—1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia—embattled Stalinist regimes relied on the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet army to crush resistance. But in 1989, the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev made clear it would not intervene. Through the policies of "glasnost" (transparency) and "perestroika" (reconstruction), Gorbachev himself had hoped to move the Soviet Union itself toward a Western-style market economy, but lost control of the process. The Soviet Union began to disintegrate, Gorbachev was ousted, and the USSR formally dissolved itself on December 25th, 1991. Three weeks later, Deng set out on his Southern Tour.

Though the collapse of the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe and the USSR were dramatic, all was not well in the capitalist world. Only five years after the sharp recession of the early 1980s, on Black Monday, October 19th, 1987, global stock indexes experienced their sharpest-ever one-day collapse, with over \$1.7 trillion wiped out on the 23 leading exchanges. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 22.6%, and the Federal Reserve responded, as it has done ever since, by flooding markets with liquidity. The sharpest market decline of all was in the market most engaged with China, that of Hong Kong—then still a British enclave—where the Hang Seng Index fell by 45.8%.

With the benefit of hindsight, the connection between market turbulence in the West and the collapse of Stalinism in the East was clear. The rise of globalized financial capital

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undermined national economies, and the more nationally-oriented the economy, the more spectacular the collapse. The fates of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Romania are memorable. But parallel developments eroded the political structures that had grown in the West and in the Third World after World War II, e.g., the national social reform programs of the United States, Britain, and France; and the import-substitution schemes of India and Mexico. Within China, Deng represented a faction of the CCP that believed resistance to globalized financial capital was futile, and that the only way forward was to fully accept it.

It should be added that Deng, and the People's Liberation Army generals who were his primary audience, probably also had in mind recent events in the Middle East. On August 2nd, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, had been led to believe that the United States would not intervene in the intra-Arab conflict. Washington, however, seized on the invasion to launch a punishing response resulting in the First Gulf War of January and February 1991. The US and its European allies obliterated the Iraqi army, which resembled the PLA in its structure and low level of technological sophistication.

III. The Southern Tour and CCP Factionalism

The Tiananmen events, the financial turbulence in the West, the destruction of the Iraqi army, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Eastern European regimes refracted through the conflict raging within the PRC. The basic line of division was between those who advocated an accelerated turn to pro-market and democratic reforms, including party general secretary Zhao Ziyang, and those who opposed it. Both Zhao and the late Hu Yaobang, whose funeral had sparked Tiananmen, were considered protégés of Deng, though they went further than their mentor in their feints toward democratic reform. The reformers' power was rooted in the section of the CCP whose wealth and influence were derived from the growth of the market economy.

Another faction, headed by Premier Li Peng and backed by party elders Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, favored scaling back the economic reforms of the previous decade. This faction's power was rooted in national control of the industry. Chen had been responsible in the 1950s for the development of China's "Five-Year Plan" economic concept, emulated from the Soviet model. These "hardliners" pointed to the collapse of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and argued that the market reforms would lead the PRC down a similar path.

The initial reaction to the Tiananmen Square protests was to freeze Deng's market reforms, a decision ratified by the CCP Central Committee in November 1989. At the same

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time, Deng resigned his position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, yielding the role to Jiang Zemin. Zhao, who had hoped to use the Tiananmen student protests to put pressure on his opponents, was dismissed, and Jiang was also elevated to general secretary in his place. During the first three years of his leadership, Jiang condemned "bourgeois liberalization," and supported the hardline or conservative position that advocated for party control of national industry and a slowing of market reforms. He was supported by Li, who increased taxes on export industries, shifted resources to centralized national industries, and sought to curb inflation. Li's Five-Year Plan, announced in 1990, raised memories of Mao's extreme national autarky. Li called for "self-reliance" and pegged economic growth at 6% per year, surely insufficient to absorb the mass rural-to-urban migration of peasants. In parallel, his allies in the media attacked market reforms.

It was during this period, between Tiananmen and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that the so-called hardliners held sway. However, the dispute between the hardliners and Deng and his followers can be overstated. Chastened by the Tiananmen protests, the latter ceased to urge controversial democratic reforms. There was no disagreement but that the bureaucracy should survive, exercising its authority through the CCP. The only issue left was *how* this was to be achieved. How far would the CCP go along "the capitalist road?"

Deng carefully selected his audience and his stops on the Southern Tour—the large cities that had gone farthest in the pro-market reforms of the 1980s, where grateful, and rich, local party cadre awaited him. Deng had formally resigned, but still wielded considerable influence in the People's Liberation Army. He was joined in his travels by PLA generals who were there, ostensibly, to "protect and escort" the retired paramount leader and support his efforts to "reform and open up," as well as by state security head Qiao Shi. Deng's message to the PLA generals and the security chiefs who had been sobered by the recent Iraqi army debacle was that only rapid economic growth could deliver an increase to the military budget, and a modernization of the PLA's capabilities.

In an indication that Deng's success was not foreordained, the tightly controlled national Chinese media did not report on his tour until two months after its conclusion in Shanghai. It was initially reported only in the regional media of the provincial cities he visited. Deng had intentionally circumvented the formal CCP leadership, attempting to present them with a *fait accompli* at the conclusion of his tour.

Deng demanded a stronger embrace of the capitalist market, proclaiming that southern China should become the next "Asian Tiger," following South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. He insisted to a gathering of party elders before his tour that only rapid

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growth could ensure CCP rule, stating:

"If the economy cannot be boosted over a long time, it [the government] will lose people's support at home and will be oppressed and bullied by other nations of the world. The continuation of this situation will lead to the collapse of the Communist Party."

At a stop in Guangdong, Deng intervened to preserve recently established stock exchanges:

"It'll take careful study to determine whether stocks and the stock market are good for socialism or not, or whether they only belong to capitalism. This also means that we must first try it out!"

In Shenzhen, which was emerging as the cutting edge of Chinese capitalism, Deng stated that CCP cadre should:

"...be bolder in carrying out the reforms and opening-up, dare to make experiments and should not act as women with bound feet. If you think something is right, then bravely test it and embrace it. The important experience of Shenzhen is the daring spirit. Without this daring spirit and the courage, without the energy, you cannot find a good path or a new path, and you cannot create a new career."

Deng put the hardliners on notice. "Whoever is opposed to reform must leave office," he said in Shenzhen. Addressing leading generals of the PLA in Zhuhai, Deng declared that "those who do not promote reform should be brought down from their leadership positions."

In Shanghai, the last stop of his tour, Deng summarized his thinking:

"We should absorb more foreign capital and more foreign-advanced experiences and technologies and set up more foreign-invested enterprises. Do not fear when others say we are practicing capitalism. Capitalism is nothing fearsome."

The struggle played out over the following months, but finally, at a Politburo Plenum held on March 9th-10th, 1991, Deng's thought was proclaimed as the new orthodoxy of the CCP in the form of Central Document Number 2. By April 1992, Jiang had solidarized himself with Deng. Chen Yun and the other party elders who had opposed rapid capitalist development were shunted aside. In late 1992, Jiang dissolved the Central Advisory Commission, a body of party elders comprised of the "Eight Immortals," including Deng,

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Chen, and Li Xiannian, which had arbitrated differences as an ultimate authority in the CCP. The act severed the remaining personal connection in the CCP leadership to the experience of the Chinese Revolution of 1949.

IV. China's Capitalist Road to the Present

Earlier in his career, when Deng had been cast out of power, Mao denounced him as a "capitalist roader." Late in his career, Deng was able to use his influence in the military and among party cadre to marginalize and defeat the section of the CCP leadership that remained hostile to rapid capitalist development and committed to a high degree of government ownership of industry.

The party fell in line. Deng seemed to offer the only way forward. China will be opened as the world's premier cheap labor platform. His victory set the stage for an extraordinary economic development, with the economy averaging 10% GDP growth per year since 1978 when Deng put in place his "four modernizations."

As detailed in our aforementioned CIO Perspective, this growth has resulted in profound qualitative changes. While poverty has been greatly reduced, social inequality—and the social grievances that go along with it—has increased. "To get rich is glorious," went one of Deng's maxims. There are now 698 billionaires in China, according to *Forbes*. Industrial conflict and urban unrest, which so worried the CCP during Tiananmen, have much more explosive potential today than they did in 1989. There are currently several hundred million wage workers, with some two-thirds of the Chinese population living in cities, and at least 50 cities with more than two million inhabitants. Nonetheless, millions of peasants continue to pour into the cities from the countryside—12 million just in the past year—under conditions where the growth of employment in factories producing cheap products for global markets is slowing, precisely because China has become a "middle-income" nation.

Meanwhile, the CCP, starting with Deng, has itself eroded the social cohesion provided by the variant of communist ideology it once upheld, setting up the legal basis for capitalist property relations. Indeed, it is one of history's peculiar ironies that the "communist" party of China has become the vehicle by which Chinese capitalism thrives. By 1994, China had established an open labor market. In 1999, private property was acknowledged as an "important component" within the economy. In 2002, the CCP changed its rules to allow private business owners to join the party. In 2004, a constitutional amendment, Article 13, proclaimed that "private property is inviolable."

V. China Faces a New Set of Challenges

The Chinese government has seemingly withstood every financial storm that has hit its shores from the West, including the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, and the COVID disruptions of the past few years. But the power of finance within the Chinese economy has only grown. The economy is rife with zombie firms and bad debts, as the collapse of the real estate giant Evergrande Group has dramatized. It cannot be ruled out that the next global financial crisis will emerge *from* China.

Under Xi, China has nevertheless attempted to deleverage itself and step over the financial trip wire. To that end, the CCP made a series of large-scale economic interventions in 2021, which were laid out in the 14th Five-Year Plan. These interventions combine an insistence on further capitalist development with a strong emphasis on stability—economic, social, and political.

This has entailed, in part, forcing a carefully measured move toward margin calls with its most exposed firms, such as Evergrande, as well as with regional governments whose breakneck efforts to meet development imperatives in the last decade encouraged reckless lending and debt recycling. The Beijing-based financial newspaper *Securities Daily* reports that State-Operated Enterprises (SOEs), which were out of favor under Deng, are now being promoted to clean up the real estate debt mess. And *Bloomberg* writes:

"The days of blistering home-price gains and debt-fueled building sprees by billionaire property tycoons are set to fade. They'll be replaced by a much more staid market where authorities are quick to clamp down on speculative frenzies and development is dominated by state-run companies earning utility-like returns."

Such are Beijing's efforts to contain the destabilizing effects of real estate speculation. Reforms extend to financial and social media firms. One of the Chinese firms with the biggest global profile, Jack Ma's Ant Financial, has been subject to a regulatory crackdown since the fall of 2020. This was only the beginning. As China analyst Dan Wang put it, further measures included "the decapitation of online tutoring, new restrictions on video games, anti-monopoly actions against internet platforms, and passage of statutes governing data and privacy."

These efforts targeting real estate, finance, and social media serve a dual purpose. First, Beijing is intent on orienting society—including human resources, infrastructure, and capital—toward the creation of value, and discouraging what it views as the misallocation of resources to industries that add little real long-term economic output. Second, Beijing increasingly views these industries, especially social media information technologies, as

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socially and politically destabilizing forces, which it aims to neutralize.

Xi's larger thrust is to emphasize those parts of the economy that are oriented toward industries on the upper end of the value-added chain such as semi-conductors and green technologies. The 14th Five-Year Plan also calls for a dramatic expansion of the digital economy focused on, according to Xinhua, "the construction of the information network infrastructure, and a national-level integrated big data center system coordinating computing power, algorithms, data, and application resources," as well as the deepening of "comprehensive digital transformation in key industries, including all-around and full-chain digital transformation of traditional industries and higher digitization level in the agricultural industry." It promotes "strategic and forward-looking fields such as quantum information, network communications, integrated circuits, key software, big data, artificial intelligence, block-chain, and new materials, among others."

As Wang notes, Beijing's efforts are the studied opposite to that of which takes place in the United States. There, the domination over economic growth by Wall Street and by Silicon Valley, especially its software and social media firms, absorbs vast social resources, including human talent. Not even advocates of the present American entrepreneurial ethos claim that financial speculation, social media applications, and video games create value as such. The standard claim, instead, is that they develop a broader climate of economic dynamism, support innovation, and so on. But the case can also be made that they divert resources from less remunerative, but potentially more useful possibilities, such as semiconductors, green technologies, and high-speed mass transit, all sectors that China is emphasizing.

Yet, in its move up the value-added chain, China has entered upon a paradox. Its dramatic growth from 1978 onward was predicated on its status as the world's premier cheap labor platform. Within a few years of Tiananmen, foreign capital began pouring into China again. This was the significance of Deng's Southern Tour, which announced to the world that China was open for business. Business and finance rushed into Beijing's embrace with arms open—US capital in the front row—and showing little concern over China's "human rights record." In recent years, however, China's attempt to follow the course of the Asian Tigers and establish itself as a middle-income nation and a world leader in advanced technology, fundamentally altered its relationship to the global political economy. The change is not welcomed by Washington, or its allies, in an increasingly hostile world.

As it was in Deng's time, Beijing is highly conscious of the intersection between finance, the internet, and foreign pressure. This was the major theme of a recent gathering of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. Acting on instructions from Xi, the meeting resolved that, "If the financial risks are not handled well, they are easily transmitted to the

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social and political fields," where, at present, "online ideology has become the main battlefield." These pressures emerge in a world in which "external forces (i.e., the United States) trying to contain and suppress China are a major threat."

VI. Conclusion

Deng believed that a new epoch of "peace and development" had supplanted what Lenin had called the age of imperialism, and that "peaceful coexistence" with the West was possible. But today, the gathering threat of a war of potentially catastrophic consequences is undeniable. So is the immense pressure that the United States is able to bring to bear on China.

It is Xi Jinping's inevitable plight to confront these challenges marking the endpoint of the road chosen by Deng and the CCP in 1992. He has responded by elevating himself ever further above the CCP as a whole, in order to arbitrate the explosive political, social, and economic pressures mediated through the one party. Aware of the social anger building up against Chinese capitalists, and especially "the princelings" and "red aristocracy" that has been so enriched, the incumbent Chinese president has crusaded against "corruption." Regionally, he seeks to parry America's moves in Southeast Asia and buy time for the further development of China, as Beijing attempts to guide the country up the value-added chain of global capitalism. But how much time does Xi have? As we have explained:

"Xi's rule should not be seen as a platform for permanent stability, but as a bid for order made necessary by the host of difficulties confronted by Chinese capitalism. Xi is not suspended in thin air above China. His power, rooted in the military and police, teeters above the antagonistic class forces."

In our next CIO Perspective, we will return to the question of the volatile US-China relationship, which intersects with explosive social and political tensions in each country.

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